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OPTIMIZATION ANALYSIS OF THE U.S. AGGREGATE CONSUMPTION:
A GOODNESS-OF-FIT APPROACH
by Bahram Adrangi* and Kambiz Raffiee**
Abstract
ThIS paper exammes the hypothesIs of optlmlzmg behavIOr of the U S. consumers usmg
quarterly and seasonally adjusted senes on real consumer expenditures on eIght commodIty
groups. clothIng, durable goods, energy, food, hOUSIng, medIcal care, transportatIon, and other~
for the perIod of 1947 I through 1993 I. FolloWIng the Weak AXIom of Revealed Preference
(W ARP), a money-metnc utIlIty functIon is derIved to calculate an effIcIency mdex to
determme the percentage dIfference between the obscl ved cost of consumptIon and the optImum
cost of consumption m each penod of the sample The empmcal resulb provide eVidence that
the allocativc effiCIency 111 the U S ha~ improved only slIghtly due to the wave of deregulatlom
m the early 1980s. Our results are COTI5lstent with the predIctIOns of the general theory of second
best m showmg that gams In the allocattve effiCiency may be mll1lmal a~ long as many sectors
of the economy remam partially or totally regulated

I. Introduction
The U.S economy has undergone a dramatIc
transformatIOn from consisting of a large
number of small flrms during the 18th and 19th
centuries to being increasingly dominated by
giant corporations in the 20th century. The
growth of big bus mess led to concentration of
economIc power III the hands of few firms while
increaSIng productIvity and standard of hving.
Increasing corporate power precipItated the
government regulation of industries [peltz man ,
1977]. For example, most trucking, raIlroad
rates and routes, and waterway shipping were
regulated under the Interstate Commerce Commission established in 1887. Despite some
successes, the outcomes of government regulatory efforts have been mixed at best In many
cases a clear economic case for regulation, I.e.,
a lack of well-defined property rights, deficient
InformatIOn In the market, and existence of
natural monopolies, does not eXIst. Therefore,
in the last few decades government policies
toward business have attracted interest among
politICIans, economIsts, and the public at large.
The discussions have often centered on the issue
of competition In the market place and ways to
enhance the degree of competition in the
economy The consensus among policy makers
and economists alike seems to be that more

competItIOn in the market place may improve
productive and allocative effIciencIes In the
economy.
These discussIOns and concerns resulted In the
partIal or total deregulatIOn of industries such as
aIrlines, bankIng, and trucking III the late 1970s
and early 1980s. Even partial deregulatIOn of
any sector IS lauded by economIst'> as a means of
improvement 1Il allocative and productive effIciencies. However. the general theory of second
best maIntains that the benefits of piece-meal
policie'> of deregulatIOn may be overstated.
AccordIng to this theory, as long as regulatory
constraInts are imposed on some sectors of the
economy, even the restoration of pareto optimalIty condItions In other sectors may not produce
the desired optimum productive and allocatJve
efficiencies [Peltzman, 1976; Schmalensee,
1979; StIgler, 1971; Weiss; 1981].
Many researchers, particularly in the past two
decades, have measured or analyzed economic
effICIency in the newly deregulated industries.
For example, Adrangl et a1. [1995], Moore
[1986], Winston et al. [1990], Daughty and
Nelson [1988], and Ylllg [1990a, 1990b],
among others, study the deregulatIOn of the U. S.
trucking Illdustry and Its effects on the productIvity and technical efficiency of the trucking
Illdu:,try. Almost all of these studies conclude
that the deregulatIOn of thIS industry resulted III
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rate reductions and improvements in technical
efficiency. WInston et al. (1990) find that
shippers and ultimately consumers and the
society benefited from the deregulation of the
trucking industry by approximately $11 billion
(in 1977 dollars) annually.
Other researchers, Bailey et al. [1985], Bailey
and Williams [1988], Borenstein [1989, 1990],
Graham et al. [1983], and Morrison and
Winston [1993]. among others, show that the
deregulation and structural transition in the U. S.
airline industry have drastically improved airline
efficiency and reduced air fares.
Similarly, the last two decades have witnessed
a serious increase in crittcal scrutiny of publIc
policy toward the banking industry. Longstanding restrictions on various aspects of the industry
due to regulation. e.g, limits on pricing, on
asset management, and on geographic expansion, have been reduced or eliminated in recent
years. Deregulation has also changed conditions
of entry, type of products that financial
intermediaries may legally offer, and degree of
competition in banking markets. The conditions
of stability, efficiency, and resource allocations
of the banking industry are all improved under
deregulatIOn [Gilbert, 1984; Kane. 1981; Rose,
1987].
Despite the aforementioned moves in the U.S.
economy toward a "freer market" with less
regulations and controls by the government,
government agencies such as Federal Aviation
Agency (FAA), Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), and Federal CommunicatIOns Commission (FCC) still regulate diverse sectors of
the economy such as trucking, banking, airlines,
railr<flt1is, barges, pipelines, and telecommunicationt.VComplete deregulation of the economy
may never occur, perhaps due to externalities,
pubhc goods, and natural monopolies. Restrictive regulation in the absence of "market
failure" may also stem from a lack of concrete
evidence that increased competition In the
economy leads to enhanced allocative and
productive efficiencies.
The past research on economic gains from
competitive markets and reduced deregulation
has focused on the supply-side of the economy
and gains in technical and productive efficiencies. In contrast to the supply-side issues and
technical effiCiency, the demand-side of the
market has received very little attention. The

question of whether consumers are maximizing
utility subject to budget constraint, i.e., exact
optimizing behavior, is assumed but generally
not critically tested and evaluated in the
academic literature. This issue is important
because efficiency on the production and
supply-side is not sufficient to guarantee the
efficiency in the entire economy unless the
consumer behavior also satisfies the conditions
of utility maximizatIOn under constraint.
The examination of consumer behavior is not
unrelated to the deregulation of various sectors
of the economy. The deregulation provides
consumers an opportunity to benefit from
choices that the competitive market offers. Do
consumers actually take advantage of the freer
market and strive to allocate their resources most
efficiently as professed by the neoclassical
theory of consumer behavior? If on the demandside consumers are not allocating their scarce
resources in accordance with the utility maximization paradigm, then the economy may not
achieve maximum efficiency despite gains in
productive efficiency.
This paper presents new empincal evidence
on the nature of optimizing behavior of the U.S.
consumers using quarterly and seasonally adjusted series in 1987 dollars, taken from the
Citibase, on real consumer expenditures on eight
commodity categories: clothing, durable goods,
energy, food, housing, medical care, transportation, and others for the period of 1947:1 through
1993:1. Following the Weak Axiom of Revealed
Preference (W ARP) developed by Varian
[1990], a money-metric utility function is
derived and an efficiency index is calculated to
determine the percentage difference between the
observed cost of consumption and the optimum
cost of consumption for each period of the
sample.
The empincal results provide evidence that
the alloc<ative efficiency in consumption In the
U. S. has improved only slightly in the aftermath
of the wave of deregulations in the early 1980s.
Our fIndings seem to be consistent with the
predictions of the general theory of second best
in showing that gains in the allocative efficiency
may be minimal as long as many sectors remain
partially or totally regulated.
The outline of this paper is as follows.
SectIOn II presents the theoretical framework for
deriving the efficiency index following the
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WARP. The application of the WARP to the
analysis of the hypothesis of optimizing behavior of the U.S. consumers and the empirical
findings are discussed in Section III. The
conclusion of this study is summarized in the
final sectIon.

II. Methodology
Consider a consumption process by a consumer that generates an observed set of data (Pi,
X) for 1 = 1, ... , n, where pi is a vector of
good prices and X is a vector of good demands
Let the revealed preference relation of the
consumer be presented by the notation >. If
these data were generated by the utilitymaxImizing behavior of the consumer, It must
satisfy the followlllg conditIOn:
if EW, X) ::; E(P I, XI)

(1)

where EW, X) = pi XI is the cost of the
observed consumption choice, and E(P I, Xl) =
plXI IS the cost of any other consumptIOn choice.
This critenon is known as the WARP. This
condition is both necessary and suffIcient for
utIlity-maximizing behavIOr. If a data set
satisfIes the WARP. then it IS possIble to
construct an expenditure functIOn that would
generate the observed deCISIons as utilitymaximizing deciSIOns. Discussion on consistency with utilIty maximIzation based on the
WARP can be found in Afriat [1972], Akerlof
and Yellen [1985], Diewert and Parkan [1985],
and Varian [1985, 1990], among others.
In the empIrical analysis of consistency WIth
utIlIty minimization, one has to make the
distmction between the conventional tests and
the goodness-of-flt tests. The major critIcIsm of
the conventIonal tests is that they are based on
exact optimlzmg behavior. Hence the conventional tests are exact tests in the sense that eIther
the data pass the test exactly, or they don't If
the data fail the test, the optImIzing hypothesis
is rejected and the magllltude of the deviatIOn
between observed and optImum choIces cannot
be determined. On the other hand, nearly
optimizing behavIor IS just as good as exact
optImizing behavior III the sense that one only
has to define a reasonable deVIation between
optimum and observed choices to accept the
hypotheSIS of nearly optimIzing behaVIOr [Aker-

lof and Yellen, 1985: Cochrane, 1989, Varian,
1984, 1985, 1990]. The notIon of nearly
optimizing behavior IS the basis for the applIcatIOn of the goodness-of-flt tests as opposed to
the conventional tests to mvestJgate the characteristICS of exact optImizing behavior.
An index of efficiency developed by Afriat
[1972] and described m Varian [1990] IS used to
derive a goodness-of-fit measure to examine
utility-maximIzing behavIOr. If there is a
violation of the WARP. then EW, X) > CW,
Xl) for all Xl 2: X The relative measure of
departure from utilIty maximization IS given by
the effiCIency index, e l, defined as
e l = 1 - EW, Xl)/ECPI. X)

(2)

The effiCiency index IS the percentage chfference
between the cost of the observed consumptIon
choice and the cost of any other consumption
chOICe ThIS mdex IS a relatIve measure of how
much the consumer could have saved If Xl rather
than XI was purchased at price pl. If the value of
the efficiency index is small. then it would be
reasonable to consider the consumer a~ bemg a
nearly utIlIty maXImIzer. A reduction m the
value of the mdex is al50 an indication of an
Improvement in the optimizmg behavior of the
consumer.
The fIrst step III applymg the goodness-of-flt
measure i~ estImating the total cost of consumption that would have been Incurred by the
consumer, E(PI, Xl), had Xl rather than X been
chosen based on meaningful optimizing prinCIples. E(PI. XI) could then be compared WIth
observed expenditure data. E(PI. X), to calculate the effIciency mdex given In equation (2)
As a procedure to estimate E(PI. XI), conSider
the following generalized Cobb-Douglas utIlity
function of a consumer.
II

u

IT
(=

~\,

iI,.

, I

1..

• • • "

11

(3)

I

where XI is the quantity consumption of good i
and a is the expenditure share of good I The
demand functions consIstent WIth the conditions
of the WARP in equation (I) and the utdity
function in equation (3) are
l
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X, = a,E (PI, Xl)/P,; i

= 1, . . ..

.. , n (4)

where p, is the market price of good i To make
the system of equation:- of good demands m
equation (4) consistent, I.e., E(P'. XJ) = 2p,X"
the restriction is imposed so that 2a, = 1
To derive the explicit expression for the
expenditure function E(P', XJ), the good demands in equation (4) are substituted into
equation (3) and solved for E(P', XJ). The
resulting equation is:
(5)

Takmg the natural logarithm of both sides of
equation (5), one gets.
/)
n

-

n

~arLna,
r=\

+

/

~a,Ln(P',X,)

(6)

1=1

Equation (6) is the explicit functional form of
the expenditure function consistent with the
necessary and sufficient conditions of utilitymaximizing behavior implied by the WARP. It
is also noted that the natural logarithm of the
actual expenditures by a consumer on all goods,
LnE(P', X'), IS equal to the natural logarithm of
the expenditure-minimizing amount, LnE(P',
XJ), plus an error term, u, representing the
optimization error. Using equation (6), one
obtains:
LnE (PI, X')

LnE (PI, Xl)

+

u

(7)

or
LnE (P', Xi)
n

+~

a,Ln(p,x,)

+

U

(8)

,~l

To develop the goodness-of-fit test to examine
consistency with utility-maximization, the parameters in equation (8) are estimated subject to the
restriction that 2a, = 1. Once these estimates are

obtained, one can determine the expenditure of
the consumption choice implied by the WARP,
E(P', XJ), in equation (6), and then calculate the
efficiency index, e', in equatIOn (2) to examine the
optimizing behavior of consumers. The empirical
results of the test of optimizing behavior of aggregate consumption expenditures in the U.S. are
presented in the sequel.

III. Empirical Results
In thiS section. the empirical results of the test
of the hypothesis of optlmizmg behaVIOr of the
U.S. consumers are discussed. First, the overall
aggregate consumption behavior in the U.S. is
examined by estimating equation (8) using
quarterly and seasonally adjusted series in 1987
dollars, taken from the Citibase, on real
consumer expenditures on eight commodity
categories: clothing, durable goods, energy,
food, housing, medical care, transportation, and
others for the penod of 1947:1 through 1993:1.
Additionally, the estimation results are checked
for both first-order and fourth-order autocorrelation. Second, the sequential Chow test is
performed to test for the occurrence of structural
change m the aggregate consumption during the
period of the study. Finally, the efficiency index
is calculated for each period by estimating
equation (8) and using equations (2) and (6) to
determine the magnitude of the departure from
cost-minimizing behavior in consumption.
Descriptive statistics and defmition of the
variables used in the study are listed in Table 1.
The OLS estimate of equation (8) subject to the
restrictIOn that 2a, = 1 is shown in Table 2.2 It
IS noted that each of the coefficient estimates has
the expected sign and is significant at the 5
percent level. The estimated regression explains
over 99 percent of the variation in the total
consumption expenditures as is indicated by the
adjusted R2 The estimated Durbin-Watson
(OW) statistic of 0.413 indicate~ the presence of
the positive first-order autocorrelation at any
reasonable level of significance.
Equation (8) is reestimated usmg the maximum-likelihood (ML) estimation technique for
correction of the first-order autocorrelation. The
results are reported in Table 3. 3 The results on
the coefficient estimates have the expected sign
and are sigmficant at the 5 percent level. The
estimated OW statistic is 2 03, confirming the
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TABLE I
Descnptlve Statistics for the Expenditure Function Vanables, U.S Economy,
1947 I to 1993.1"
Vanables
Total ConsumptIOn Expenditures
Clothing
Durables
Enelgy
Food
Housmg
Medical Care
Transportation
Others
a

All the figures on the mean are

III

TABLE 2
EstImated Consumption ExpendIture FunctIon
Under the WARP; U S Economy,
1947 I to 1993.1
Coefficient

o 160181

Clothmg
Durables
Energy
Food
Housmg
Medical Care
TramportatIOn
Others
Intercept

0084585
0.013448
0237149
0.074260
o 116747
0.044930
0.257279
1.897710

Adjusted R2
D.W

0.99
0413

SD

1886.16
98.03
21658
7441
37834
277 28
20655
73 19
560.77

80398
4687
11805
18.72
93.29
132.00
12664
28.19
24678

bllhons of dollars

removal of the fIrst-order autocorrelation from
the estimated regressIOn
Given the sample period 'of 1947:1 to 1993:1,
one would expect some structural mstability in
the model coefficIents. In order to examine the
stability of the model, a formal test for the
structural stabIlIty of the model is performed
based on the sequential Chow test [Green,
1993]. The F-value for the Chow test is II .36
obtained at the period of the first quarter of
1985. The calculated statistic IS statistically
SIgnificant at the 5 percent level, suggestmg that
there indeed IS a structural change in 1985. 4
Consequently, equation (8) is reestimated for
each of the two sub-periods of 1947:1 to 1984:IV
and 1985:1 to t 993:1 using the ML estimation
technIque for correction of the first-order

Vanable

Mean

autocorrelatIOn subject to the restnctlOn that la,
= 1. The results are reported in Table 4, and are
used to calculate the effICIency Illdex to examine
the hypothesis of optimizing behavior of the
U.S. consumers in each of the sub-periods as
descnbed below.
The last step is to empirically examme the
fundamental question of whether the com.umptlon behaVior in the US. over the penod of the
study is consistent with the WARP explamed in
Section II. The basis for this analysis IS the
estimatIOn result of the expenditure functIOn in
equation (8), reported in Table 4, and the
calculation of the efficiency index in equation

(2)
Usmg the parameter estimates of the expendi-

TABLE 3
Maxlmum-Llkelthood (ML) E~tlmate of the
ExpendIture Function With CorrectIOn for the
First-Order Autocorrelation Under the WARP. U S
Economy: 1947.I to 1993.1

Standard
Error

Variable

CoeffICient

Standard
Error

0.006477
0.002604
0005252
0.010012
0005306
0.006339
0002968
0007654
0024134

C]othmg
Durables
Energy
Food
Housmg
Medical Cale
Transportation
Others
Intercept

o ]50744
0095698
0032985
0220987
0098104
0075228
0.040740
0276072
1 000402

0007954
0003216
0004445
0007175
0.008731
0005603
0.005346
0.009110
0000136

Adjusted R2
OW.

099
203
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TABLE 4
Maximum-Llkehood (ML) Estimate of the ExpendIture FunctIOn wIth CorrectIOn for the FIrst-Order
AutocorrelatIOn Under the WARP; U S. Economy; Sub-penods of 1947:1 to 1984:IV and 1985:1 to 1993:1
Standard
CoefficIent
Error
(1985.I to 1993'1)

Standard
CoefficIent
Error
(1947:1 to 1984' IV)

Variable
Clothlllg
Durables
Energy
Food
Housing
MedIcal Care
Transportation
Others
Intercept
Adjusted R2
D.W.

0.166100
0.118729
0.014947
0.141736
o 125985
0.111851
0022484
0282888
811XIO- s
0.99
2.14

0.008192
0.003381
0004530
0.006885
0009221
0.005228
0.005148
0.008651
0.000157

0.156677
0.088219
0.031145
o 222969
o 104837
0.070845
0036254
0.275872
0.000213
0.99
1.78

ture function in equation (8) in each sub-period
of the study, reported in Table 4, and the result
in equation (6), the cost-minimizing level of
expenditures for consumption, E(P', XJ), is
estimated. From these estimations and the
observed consumption expenditure figures,
E(P', X'), the efficiency index, e', in equation
(2) is calculated.
It should be emphasized that the calculated
values of the efficiency index are positive for
each time penod because the actual cost of
consumption, E(P', X'), to purchase a given
commodity basket must always be greater than
the optImum cost of consumption, E(P', XJ), for
purchasing the same commodity basket if there
is a violation of the WARP.
The calculated efficiency index for the fIrst
quarter of selected years in each of the
sub-periods of the study is reported in Table 5.
According to these indices, U.S. consumers are
fairly efficient for all years under study. For
example, in 1947.1 the value of thIS index is

0.006569
0.002776
0003083
0.004301
0.009235
0.006096
0004486
0004081
6.27 X 10- 5

0.10 indIcating that the actual consumption
expenditures on all goods and services consumed are fairly close to their optimal levels.
The value of the coefficient rises to 0.28 in
1984. I, indicating that the mefficiency in
consumer expenditures triples over the three
decades. ThIS could be a result of the introduction of more regulations and price and wage
controls. However, the value of the index dips
slightly in 1985.1 to 0.25 and remains constant
at 0.27 from there on. This shows some minor
gain in effICIency in consumer expenditures in
the post 1985 era as opposed to the years prior to
1985.
It may be argued that the deregulation
movements of tte early 1980s in the trucking,
airline, and banking industries, among others,
were coming to fruition by 1985. Therefore,
freer markets are expected to reduce the cost of
transportation of goods and services as well as
financial services. The benefits of the deregulatIOn are reputed to be contagious across various

TABLE 5
Selected EstImated EffIcIency Index for Measurement of Departure from Expenditure Mllllmlzation III
ConsumptIon Under the WARP, U S. Economy, Sub-periods of 1947:1 to 1984:IV and 1985'[ to 1993 I
Sub-penod
19471
o 10
Sub-period
1985.1
o 25

of 1947.1 to 1984:IV:
19501 19551 19601
0.25
0.26
0.26
of 1985:1 to 1993:1'
19901 to 1993:1'
0.27
0.27

19651
0.27

1970.1
0.28

1975.1
0 28

19801
0.28

1984.IV
0.28
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sectors and throughout the economy by reducing
the cost-push inflation. As proponents of
deregulation have argued, III the end, consumers
benefIt from the lower costs of good sand
services and are able to allocate their resources
more efficIently, thus, improving their welfare.

available baskets of goods and services and are
able to allocate their resources more efficiently,
thus, improving efficiency in consumption and
their welfare.

IV. Conclusion
The deregulation of various sector~ of the
economy ccrtamly provides consumers an opportunIty to benefIt from choIces that the
competItIve market offers. The relevant issue is
whether consumers actually take advantage of
the deregulation process. and strive to allocate
their resources most efficiently. If on the
demand-')Ide consumers are not allocatmg their
scarce resources in accordance with the utility
maximization paradigm, then the economy may
not achieve maximum efficiency despite gains in
productive efficiency.
This paper analyzes the U.S. consumers' optimizing behavior hypothesis for the period of 1947.I
through 1993.1. The estimation results indicate that
the U.S consumers are fairly efficient for all years
under study. For the period of 1947.I to 1984.IV,
the estimate of the consumption efficiency index,
measuring the percentage difference between the
cost of the observed consumption choice and the
cost of the optimum consumption choice under
WARP, ranges from 0.10 in 1947.I to 0.28 in
1984.1Y. This finding indicates that the consumers
were almost three times below their optimum consumption expenditure in 1984 as compared to
1947. This could be a result of the introduction of
more regulations, e.g., transportation and banking,
and price and wage controls. However, the value of
the index declines slightly in 1985.I to 0.25 and
remains constant at 0.27 for the remaining years till
1993. This slight improvement in the consumers'
efficiency after 1984.I may mark the beginning of
the beneficiary effect of less regulation by the
government.
It may be argued that the potential deregulation
movements benefits of the early 1980s in a number
of key industries, e.g., the trucking, airlines, and
banking industries, among others, were starting to
materialize by 1985, resulting into reduced costs of
transportation of goods and financial services. As
proponents of deregulation have argued, in the end,
consumers benefit from the lower costs of more
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Notes
1. It is noted that under a current proposal by the
Clinton Administration the Congress IS considering the elimination of the Interstate Commerce
Commission.
2 SInce ItS constant term is non-linear, equation (8)
IS estimated nonlinearly subject to the reqUIrement
that ka = 1. The results are, agaIn, Similar to
those reported In Table 2
3. The use of quarterly data In this paper warrants a
concern over the fourth-order serIal correlation In
the disturbance term of equation (8). ThiS
possibility IS Investigated using the Lagrange
MultiplIer (LM) test due to Breusch (1978) and
Godfrey (1978). The calculated chi-square statistic is 8 43. Based on the critical value of the
chi-square statistic with 4 degrees of freedom at
the 5 percent level of sigmficance of 9.49, the
maintained hypotheSIS of no fourth-order senal
correlation in the disturbance term of equatIOn (8)
IS accepted.
4. The finding of the structural change in the
residuals of the estimation results reported in
Table 3 IS also checked using a cusum square
(CUSUMS) test of the residuals. With a 95
percent confidence bond, the CUSUMS test of the
reSiduals confirms the finding that there is a
structural change In the period of the study at the
first quarter of 1985.
j
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